The Prison Litigation Reform Act Obstructs Justice for Survivors

"PLRA poses a difficult obstacle to prisoners, and many prisoners will be denied relief solely because of its provisions." - Elizabeth Alexander, Director, ACLU National Prison Project

Why don't more inmates sue when they are sexually assaulted behind bars? Part of the answer is that the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), passed in 1996, effectively prevents many survivors of rape behind bars from seeking redress in federal court. Prior to the passage of the PLRA, a prisoner who was raped or assaulted by prison officers could sue for money damages and other relief from the responsible party. Prisoners who were victimized by other inmates due to the indifference or negligence of prison staff could challenge the operations of the prison in court. The PLRA significantly limits these rights - so much so that, for many inmates, it is an insurmountable obstacle to legal action.

Because it cripples prisoners' legal power, the PLRA removes incentives for jails and prisons to prevent and responsibly react to cases of prisoner rape. But prisoner rape is a crime that can often be documented with reliable DNA evidence - something that should not be obscured by bureaucratic legislation and reams of red tape. Stop Prisoner Rape believes that, at a minimum, cases of prisoner rape should be made an exception to the PLRA. Better still would be the repeal of this ill-conceived law.

THE FACTS

• The PLRA bars an inmate from filing suit unless he or she has exhausted the internal grievance procedures available at the prison - systems that are often slow and ineffective, and subject the prisoner to retaliation by staff. In the case of a prisoner abused by a corrections officer, a victim is forced to seek redress from the friends and co-workers of the very person who committed the rape.
• Under the PLRA, a prisoner must exhaust the facility's internal remedies even when: (1) a prison's administrative system does not meet minimum federal standards and fails to provide speedy and effective remedies for the prisoner,¹ (2) a prison's grievance system does not provide the remedy sought by the prisoner,² and (3) a prison has a practice of denying all claims brought by inmates.³
• The PLRA requires prisoners held in privately operated jails to exhaust their administrative remedies, regardless of whether the remedies provided by the private facility meet any specified state or federal standards.⁴
• The PLRA entirely bars prisoners from bringing damages claims for mental or emotional injuries without a prior showing of physical harm.⁵ This poses a potential obstacle for victims who have submitted to unwelcome sexual advances by perpetrators using threats or coercion.
• In the 1990s, over 1,200 local prison and jail systems, including several in major urban areas, were under federal court supervision for failure to maintain humane conditions in their facilities.⁶ Under the PLRA, this court supervision automatically terminates upon the motion of the prison system unless the court makes detailed factual findings of a current and on-going constitutional violation.⁷ If the court does not step in quickly, the supervision automatically ends, even if the abuses are still ongoing.8 These provisions have drastically reduced the ability of the courts to ensure humane conditions in local prisons.
• The PLRA caps the attorney fees that can be recovered in cases filed by prisoners⁹ and limits the tasks for which fees can be awarded.¹⁰ The practical effect of these limitations is to discourage attorneys from representing even prisoners with strong cases, because of the difficulty involved in obtaining compensation for their work.
   

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  [1] Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002); Larkin v. Galloway, 266 F. 3d 718 (7th Cir. 2001); Castillo v. Buday, 85 F. Supp. 2d 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).

  [2] Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001).

  [3] Perez v. Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections, 182 F. 3d 532 (7th Cir. 1999).

  [4] Murphy v. Jones, 2001 WL 1450636 (9th Cir. 2001); Milledge v. McCall, 2002 WL 1608449 (10th Cir. 2002).

  [5] 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).

  [6] Anne K. Heidel, Due Process Rights and the Termination of Consent Decrees Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 4 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 561 (April 2002); John Sullivan, States and Cities Removing Prisons from Courts' Grip, N.Y. Times, January 30, 2000, § 1, at 1.

  [7] The court supervision can be terminated under the PLRA regardless of the likelihood that the facility's violations will continue when the supervision is stopped. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b); Cason v. Seckinger, 231 F.3d 777 (11th Cir. 2000); Gilmore v. California, 220 F.3d 987, 1009 n.27 (9th Cir. 2000).

  [8] The court must rule within 30 to 90 days of the filing of the motion. In the absence of a ruling, supervision is automatically suspended regardless of the existence of constitutional violations. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2); Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000).

  [9] Fees are capped at 150% of any judgment obtained by a defendant in a damage case. Madison v. Davis, 88 F. Supp. 2d 799, 811 (S.D. Ohio 2000).

  [10] Fees are allowed to be awarded only for work related to proving a violation of the plaintiff's rights. Hernandez v. Kalinowski, 146 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 1998).